

# Threats to privacy arising in the management of data stored in Computer Systems

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# Overview

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- We put forward the issue of the **unintended persistence of data stored in digital repositories**
- This data can be **recovered by forensic analysis**, and it may **pose a threat to privacy**

# Data preservation and analysis

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- **Intentional preservation** of history can thus serve a **good purpose** (inexpensive storage makes it possible)
- Conversely, in many scenarios, **retaining a history of past data or operations** can pose a **serious threat** to privacy and confidentiality
  - In large institutions and enterprises, systems that retain data for too long **risk unwanted disclosure**, for example by security breach





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  - A wealth of sensitive data, including **financial and medical records**, have been recovered from decommissioned hard drives
  - Digital documents published on the Web have been found to include sensitive content believed to be deleted
  - **Email was used in court cases** against Enron employees and released to the public, some of which was **contained in deleted items in folders**



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- Analysts that investigate **data repositories recovered from lost or stolen computers** can reveal sensitive information that was thought to be deleted
- Authorized investigators may **recover data from equipment subpoenaed or seized from a crime scene**, or simply in situations where company policy has been violated



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## Embedded Database storage

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- *Firefox* allows applications to **store data that persists across sessions** in an *SQLite* database. This storage is a sophisticated replacement for cookies, and can be a **prime resource for forensic investigators** to recover inadvertently retained deleted data

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- When tools and methods of forensic analysis are used by an **unauthorized party**, it **threatens privacy**



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- Existing security threats make it impossible to ensure that users will be limited to the intended interface provided by the application or the database where is stored the data. It is **necessary to consider** that an intruder will have **unrestricted access to storage on disk**



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- Threats to privacy and confidentiality usually result from unintended retention of data in **lower storage layers**, where data is accessible through **interfaces that are not controlled** by the application or the database
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- This models the capabilities of a **system administrator**, a **forensic investigator**, a **hacker** who has gained privileges on the system, or an **intruder who has breached physical security**



# Investigation: remnant data on memory cards

## Description

- Memory cards are widely used in numerous electronic devices
- Provide interfaces allowing for a large array of private and confidential data to be stored into the card
- Investigation conducted by a team of Australian researchers (Szewczyk, Sansurooah; 2011)
  - **Goal:** to determine **the sensitivity, type and amount of data** that remained on second hand card memory post sale
  - In 2011, 119 second hand memory cards were randomly purchased from eBay Australia
  - **Findings:** **highly sensitive data is stored on memory cards and it is not destroyed prior to sale**



# Investigation: remnant data on memory cards

## Results

- State of the cards
  - 75% had their data deleted and or formatted
  - 12% were not recoverable
  - 13% were purchased with all data intact and no sign of data deletion attempt
- Some of the **information** types recovered
  - **driver's license** together with full name, address and date of birth and photo of the driver with a luxury card
  - **real state settlement documents** including names, addresses and purchasing information together with copies of bank deposit cheques
  - **hundreds of photographics images** of an office party where the name of the company was showed and exposed photos of employees towards the end of the night

## Some concluding remarks

- Digital devices provide a false view of stored data
- Tools for removing data might not be effective
- Transparency principles to improve privacy seems to be needed

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